In 2007, when the global financial crisis hit—which was triggered by America's trillion-dollar wasteful wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, where it couldn't achieve much militarily these were essentially experiments under the name of the "Global War on Terrorism." The materialization of this first became evident in the 2011 Arab Spring and the 2022 protests likely referring to some specific protests, perhaps a typo or shorthand for a movement.

The entire game was about spending trillions of dollars to prepare such strategies for long-term warfare.

But when the global financial crisis struck the world in 2007, originating from the US, during that crisis, India and the European Union began discussions on a broad-based trade and investment agreement. Under this deal, they started focusing not just on goods and services, but also on intellectual property rights and government procurement, and discussions began accordingly.

However, from 2007 to 2013, while these discussions continued between the two sides, by 2013 the deal had basically collapsed. The collapse wasn't due to a single dispute. It wouldn't be wrong to say that it was an entire politically sensitive framework that neither side found fully acceptable somewhere along the line.

In simple terms, despite discussions running from 2007 to 2013, the deal failed because the European Union wanted deeper market access in India. At that time, India wanted rights related to labour movements in the European Union specifically, that our labour, especially skilled labour, could go there and participate at an advanced skilled level in the European Union's economy in various ways.

For the European Union as a bloc, this was a red line in one place, and for India, it was a red line in another. India did not want to open its market so aggressively, and the European Union was also not willing at that time to grant India the level of access to its labour market that India wanted.

As a result, the ongoing dialogue between the two completely collapsed in 2013.

But later, when this dialogue was finally revived in 2022, and after this 2022 dialogue, over the past approximately four years, deep discussions took place between various representatives trade representatives, foreign ministers, trade ministers, trade-related officials, and ministry-related officials between India and the European Union. These finally materialized in this "mother of all deals" in 2026, which India and the European Union have signed today.

Now, why did the revival of this deal (which had expired once by 2012-13) happen after all in 2022? Because by 2022, the international environment had changed significantly. First, China had by then become a very big strategic threat to Europe. China wasn't just a strategic threat because of its Belt and Road Initiative, but also because during the COVID period, the way China made global supply chains vulnerable somewhere, tried to arm-twist them, and monopolized or hijacked global supply chains this led to a deep realization in the European Union that there was a need to diversify these global supply chains.

When the negotiations were restarted, given the old experience where the talks had previously collapsed, India and the European Union decided that restarting the talks meant restructuring the negotiations. Restructuring meant that, unlike before when from 2007 onward India and the EU had been discussing a broad-based trade and investment agreement, now they said: we won't discuss just one single agreement. If we're going to discuss, let's do it on multiple treaties.

Understand this point: when India and the EU decided not to focus solely on one treaty which was why the talks had collapsed earlier why not discuss multiple treaties instead? That way, if a problem arises with any single issue, it won't derail the entire process. So, the overall talks, which had collapsed in 2013, wouldn't collapse again.

Therefore, in 2022, negotiations were opened on three tracks: we will sign a Free Trade Agreement, an Investment Protection Agreement, and a Geographical Indications Agreement. Under this three-track negotiation approach, the idea was crystal clear: don't let the talks get derailed or stuck because of any single point of disagreement. Issues were resolved gradually here, and today,

Finally in 2026, the "mother of all deals" as I've told you and as both the government and Europe are calling it—has been signed.

But the question is: based on the past four years and the old experiences, what were those issues, and how were they resolved?

The first major issue was duties, especially on wines, spirits, and automobiles. Europe is a huge exporter of wines, spirits, and automobiles. When India imports wines, spirits, and automobiles from Europe, it imposes high duties. Because of these high duties, countries like Germany, France, and Italy are significantly affected.

In this context, the debate was: would India suddenly reduce its duties entirely? That's what France, Germany, and Italy wanted. During the negotiations, it was said that if we reduce duties all at once, it could harm our domestic industries in wines, spirits, and automobiles somewhere along the line. So, why not create a workable formula here?

And what was that workable formula? It turned out to be: rather than reducing all duties in one go, we'll do product-by-product negotiations and gradually reduce duties. This was explicitly written into the "mother of all deals" as the first thing.

The second very important thing is something we saw earlier: the reason the 2013 deal collapsed was that India wanted movement access in the domains of information technology, engineering, and especially consultants who are highly skilled people. And Europe, due to its migrant policies at the time, wanted to restrict this somewhere.

So, in this context, when negotiations restarted in 2022, where did this deal finally settle? It settled at the point where we now need to structure our negotiations in such a way that you offer us different types of visas.

First, create a category of visa here that we call the Skilled Business Visa, which is written into the "mother of all deals."

The meaning of Skilled Business Visa here is that, first of all, all the high-skilled professionals in India whether in IT or engineering can now move freely to Europe. Because Europe will adopt these high-skilled persons and, together with India, build an innovation economy. Second, in this new "mother of all deals," Europe has tied up with India on something new: at this moment, Europe will also help work out and assist India in how to enhance the skills of people in India at various engineering and IT levels.

In 1991, when India's economy took a liberal turn and became a global actor, it would not be wrong to say that relations between India and the European Union began to develop for the first time.

In 1994, India and the European Union jointly signed a Cooperation Agreement at an institutionalized level. Under this Cooperation Agreement, a formal dialogue was opened between India's foreign policy institutions and the corresponding institutions within the European Union.

This dialogue, which continued from 1994, eventually transformed into a Strategic Partnership in 2004.

The Strategic Partnership is significant here because, under it, both sides added some new dimensions, the most important of which was at the political level.

Both countries agreed that there was a need to build consensus at the political level. The first area of this political consensus was built around values.

The most important value they shared was the belief in multilateralism — that is, both the European Union and India firmly believe in it.

In essence, what this means is that the European Union and India both want a rules-based order.

Under this rules-based order, their common objective was to ensure the centrality of the United Nations in the world. Both India and the European Union accept and support the kind of rules-based global order that the UN is running.

After establishing the Strategic Partnership in 2004, both sides developed a deep-level consensus on this matter.

Following that, the most significant aspect was that the European Union stated that its foreign policy is not power-centric and does not involve any power assertions.

Instead, their foreign policy is norm-driven.

Being norm-driven means that they want to engage while placing trust in global norms and global values.

So, from 2004 to 2014, whatever engagement India had with the European Union, it did not display any power assertion or power ambitions. Rather, during that period, India also explored engagement with the European Union while upholding a norm-driven, rules-based world order and the centrality of the United Nations.

Until 2014, the relationship between the European Union and India remained largely formal.

In this formal relationship, there was no visible depth at multiple levels.

After 2014, circumstances began to change, and this had repercussions on India-EU relations as well.

On one hand, China's economic dominance was growing, and on the other, Russia was engaging in power politics.

Europe began to feel that at this moment, it should neither deepen ties too much with China nor maintain any such dependency on Russia, which was coming into its own backyard to play power politics.

In this context, when the European Union tried to find a like-minded independent state, the first country that came to mind was India.

Because India, in this scenario, did not want to assert any economic dominance or engage in power politics in any way. India's game was simple.

In this context, when they once again tried to view India positively and in a new light, the first consequence of this was seen in 2015 at a high-level political summit dialogue.

The first major shift was that China launched the Belt and Road Initiative in 2013 (often referred to in this context as starting prominently around then, with major rollout post-2013/2014).

Under this initiative, China attempted to dump its surplus production into Europe and other countries around the world.

In 2014, conflict also began between Ukraine and Russia.

The first major consequence of this conflict became visible in 2015-16 when Russia occupied the Crimean region of Ukraine.

After occupying this region, and with such activities taking place in Europe's backyard, a reassessment started within the European Union.

India was the first to clearly and categorically convey one point to the European Union: Look, if we are engaging with you, we want that since you desire a rules-based world order and follow a norms-driven foreign policy—our objective in partnering with you is that, first and foremost, you will not make any comments whatsoever on our engagement with Russia in any way.

We have strategic autonomy regarding how we choose to engage with Russia.

Some players within the European Union didn't like this. Because they were intertwined with the American agenda, they wanted India to adopt only an America-centric policy isolating Russia.

However, the larger European Union eventually understood the message clearly: No, India possesses its own strategic autonomy, under which even today India has the flexibility and freedom to engage with Russia however it wishes.

That said, it wouldn't be wrong to point out that, on one level, Russia has definitely remained an irritant in the relationship between India and the European Union.

Secondly, as China’s economic dominance grew especially after the Belt and Road Initiative in 2014Europe was becoming increasingly troubled day by day.

On one hand, it was looking for solutions to that challenge, and on the other, its objective was to find ways to reduce India's over-dependence on Russia.

The political dialogues between India and the European Union that have been ongoing since 2014-15 focused primarily on one key Indian demand: If you (the EU) want us to reduce or avoid any kind of engagement with Russia say, in certain areas then first tell us how you will replace or supply the things that Russia provides us.

One major area was oil and gas. Here, the European Union responded by suggesting: Why don't we collaborate with you to champion clean energy and green energy initiatives.

The second area involved defence equipment. The EU proposed to explore purchases from our individual member countries such as France in one case, or Germany in another rather than relying solely on Russia.

This was the kind of engagement observed on those fronts.

However, on the other hand, the most problematic and challenging issue for the European Union was China.

As the EU increasingly attempted to de-couple and de-risk from China reducing dependencies and managing risks in economic, technological, and strategic terms this became a central concern driving much of their broader approach toward partnerships like the one with India.

Donald Trump has long talked about forcibly and illegally occupying Greenland a territory that belongs to Denmark. That's one thing.

But the reality is that after the Davos summit, he has now stopped making those statements in the same aggressive way.

The discussions he had about Greenland up to that point especially at Davos reveal that Greenland was really just a cover issue.

His real game the actual plan that's about to unfold is going to play out in Diego Garcia (or whatever the intended transliteration/pronunciation of "Diego Garcia" refers to likely a specific place, region, or codename in this context, though it doesn't appear in standard public sources as a major geopolitical hotspot tied to Trump/Greenland discussions).

In short Greenland served as a distraction or bargaining chip, while the true strategic objective lies elsewhere in Diego Garcia.

After observing America's attitude, the European Union reached the following understanding by 2024-25: Look, Russia is not as big a headache for us because Russia is entangled in a problem with America.

China is not as big an issue for us either, because China wants to cut into Russia's space in Europe.

Our biggest objective is: How can we save Europe from America's sphere—from America's strategic dominance.

In this context, over the past four to five years, the most important layer of discussion between India and the European Union has been the defense and strategic layer.

And do you know what the biggest thing in this defense and strategic layer is? The relationship between India and the European Union is not transformative in any way—it's incremental.

I used the word "incremental" deliberately because it means that, as of today, India and the European Union are looking at it this way: If we need to engage with India on clean energy and green energy, conduct trade on clean/green energy, or do trade in defence equipment, all these things can reach India only in one way—with maritime-level engagement.

the defense relationship between India and the European Union is not like India's defense relationships with Russia, America, or Israel.

Here, as of today, the defense relationship focuses on maritime security, cyber security, counter-terrorism dialogues, and—most importantly—Indo-Pacific issues.

It's essential to understand this because two things are very clear here:

First: The European Union now knows that maritime-level engagement is the only way to conduct trade with India on clean/green energy, defense equipment—or even tomorrow, on automobiles and pharmaceuticals under the "mother of all deals" (the FTA that's set to be signed the day after tomorrow). Thus, the maritime area will remain a core domain of action as the primary focus.

Second: The European Union also knows that in the maritime domain of action, the Indo-Pacific is the most crucial theater.

Now, the European Union understands here that America's Indo-Pacific policy is simply this: America wants to establish its dominance in the Indo-Pacific in such a way that it can counter China somewhere in the Indo-Pacific.

After all, America's objective in the Indo-Pacific is to militarize it so that America's defense industrial complex can manufacture various military equipments under this militarized Indo-Pacific framework, fool others, and sell them.

However, Europe's focus in the Indo-Pacific context is definitely not on achieving military dominance or building a global-level defense industrial complex. Instead, its objective is to view the Indo-Pacific from the perspective of global supply chains.

Therefore, it would definitely not be wrong to say that the values and thought processes of the European Union and India regarding the Indo-Pacific have been aligning somewhere along the way.

In this context, the biggest objective of this alignment is that—in the dimensions where the European Union and India have explored strategic and defense-level partnerships today—the centrality of the Indo-Pacific in this relationship is from the viewpoint of a global supply chain, and not from the viewpoint of a global-level defense industrial complex.

In the times ahead—whether it’s machinery, chemicals, any kind of automobiles, or defence equipment—if all these things are to be supplied to me through the Indo-Pacific, then the Indo-Pacific needs to be viewed here as a commercial aspect from a broad-based democratic perspective. The first priority must be to ensure that no military-centric game of any kind takes place in this area.

Now understand one thing: the way the European Union and India have looked at the Indo-Pacific—at the defence level but from a commercial-strategic angle—is something very positive and new that we are seeing as of today.

So one thing is becoming clear from this discussion: when we look at Europe’s overall objective from India’s point of view, Europe knows very well that it needs India for

• strategic relevance
• to sustain its own economic growth
• to increase its dominance and influence across the whole of Asia and especially in the Indo-Pacific.

And India too is engaging with the European Union from exactly the same perspective: India knows that if the European Union and India carefully unfold this engagement by sharing and dividing responsibilities, then on a single layer they can create a kind of global order—a global order under which the European Union and India can together establish rule-based governance.

And this becomes especially significant at a moment when the entire world is feeling suffocated by America’s dominance and by the defining and breaking of its so-called complete rule-based order.

Therefore, the messaging that the European Union has provided at this stage is very crucial. Under this messaging, the visit has been framed as an effort to once again uphold rule-based, norm-based governance.

The FTA is unlikely to cause a dramatic rupture in India-China ties (which remain complex due to border disputes, trade imbalances, and strategic rivalry), but it introduces several notable shifts that could indirectly pressure or reshape dynamics:

1. Supply-Chain De-Risking and Diversification The EU has long pursued "de-risking" from China (reducing over-reliance in critical sectors like electronics, pharmaceuticals, chemicals, and green tech).
2. The FTA accelerates this by positioning India as a reliable alternative manufacturing and sourcing hub.
3. Economists estimate trade diversion from China (5–9% in some sectors), as EU firms shift investments/production to India for preferential access.
4. Indian sectors (e.g., textiles, footwear, auto components, electronics) gain competitiveness against Chinese/Vietnamese goods in the EU market.
5. This aligns with India's own efforts to reduce its massive trade deficit with China (~$99 billion in recent years) by boosting domestic manufacturing and attracting FDI away from Chinese-dominated chains.
6. Strategic Alignment in the Indo-Pacific The deal reinforces India-EU convergence on viewing the Indo-Pacific through a rules-based, commercial, and democratic lens (not purely militarized).
7. It emphasizes maritime security, clean/green energy trade, and supply-chain resilience—areas where both see China as a challenge (e.g., Belt and Road dominance, economic coercion).
8. Enhanced EU-India defense/strategic ties (including Indo-Pacific focus) could indirectly counter China's regional influence without direct confrontation.
9. For India, deeper EU engagement reduces over-dependence on any single power (US, Russia, or China), enhancing strategic autonomy.
10. Economic Pressure on China
11. The pact diverts some European investment/sourcing from China to India, potentially costing China market share in key exports.
12. It signals a broader global trend: major economies partnering with India to hedge against China's economic assertiveness and supply vulnerabilities.
13. However, India remains heavily import-dependent on China (e.g., electronics inputs, APIs for pharma), so the FTA doesn't eliminate this interdependence overnight.
14. No Direct Escalation, But Subtle Rebalancing
15. India-China relations won't see immediate hostility from this deal alone—trade with China continues, and diplomacy (e.g., border talks) runs parallel.
16. Yet it strengthens India's hand: more bargaining power vis-à-vis China (e.g., in border negotiations or trade imbalances) by diversifying partners.
17. China may view it as part of a "containment" trend (alongside US alliances), potentially responding with outreach to India or countermeasures.

In summary, the "mother of all deals" bolsters India's multi-alignment strategy and accelerates global de-risking from China.

It gives India greater economic leverage and strategic options, subtly tilting the balance in India-China dynamics toward reduced asymmetry—without fully decoupling the two neighbours.

The real long-term effect will depend on implementation, investment flows, and how both India and the EU operationalize the broader partnership in the Indo-Pacific.

The India-EU Free Trade Agreement (FTA)—the "mother of all deals" signed on January 27, 2026—has had a notable but ultimately positive and catalysing impact on India-US relations, especially in the context of the second Trump administration's aggressive tariff policies.

The deal was widely seen as a strategic hedge by both India and the EU against US unpredictability: Trump had imposed 50% tariffs on Indian goods (including a 25% reciprocal tariff plus an additional 25% penalty tied to India's continued purchases of discounted Russian oil). This created economic pressure on India and strained bilateral ties, even as strategic cooperation (e.g., Quad, defence, Indo-Pacific) continued.

Key Impacts on India-US Relations

1. Accelerated US-India Trade Reset The EU-India pact acted as a wake-up call for Washington. Analysts noted it could "light a fire" under stalled US-India trade talks.
   
   • Just days after the EU deal (around February 3, 2026), Trump announced a significant concession: US tariffs on Indian goods reduced from 50% to 18%, with reciprocal easing from India on certain barriers.
   • This included commitments to target $500 billion bilateral trade, stronger tech/energy partnerships, and boosts for Indian MSMEs/exporters.
   • The move was framed as Trump refusing to be "outdone" by Europe, signalling that the US would not let major partners drift into alternative blocs without responding.
2. Geopolitical Rebalancing and Leverage
   
   • The EU deal sent a clear message: India (and Europe) could pursue deep economic ties independently, emphasizing rules-based trade over tariffs. EU leaders (e.g., Ursula von der Leyen, António Costa) highlighted it as a "geopolitical stabiliser" and a signal favouring open cooperation amid US protectionism.
   • For India, this enhanced strategic autonomy and bargaining power—diversifying markets reduced vulnerability to US tariffs, allowing New Delhi to negotiate from strength rather than defensiveness.
   • It subtly pressured the US to prioritize a bilateral deal, preventing India from leaning too far toward non-Western alignments (e.g., deeper Russia/China ties under tariff pain).
   • Some US lawmakers (e.g., Senator Mark Kelly) expressed unease, blaming Trump for alienating allies and pushing partners like India toward independent paths—highlighting a perceived loss of US influence.
3. No Fundamental Damage to Core Ties
   
   • Strategic pillars (defence, intelligence, Indo-Pacific countering China, technology) remain intact and even reinforced. The trade friction was largely economic/tariff-driven, not existential.
   • The quick US tariff cut post-EU deal suggests the FTA improved rather than worsened relations in the short term—turning potential alienation into renewed engagement.
   • Ongoing diplomacy (e.g., high-level visits, talks on supply chains) continues, with the deal positioning India as a more attractive alternative manufacturing hub for US firms amid global de-risking from China.
4. Broader Implications
   
   • Positive for India: Cushions tariff hits, diversifies exports (textiles, pharma, etc.), and strengthens multi-alignment—gains from EU access give India leverage vis-à-vis the US without burning bridges.
   • Mixed for US: Short-term backlash (e.g., White House unease, congressional criticism) but long-term incentive to stabilize ties with a key Quad partner. Trump framed the reset as a win, avoiding isolation.
   • The dynamic underscores a shifting global order: major democracies hedging against US volatility while preserving strategic convergence against shared challenges (China, supply-chain resilience).

In summary, the "mother of all deals" did not rupture India-US relations—it catalyzed a pragmatic reset. By demonstrating viable alternatives, it prompted the US to de-escalate tariffs and revive trade momentum, ultimately bolstering bilateral economic engagement while reinforcing India's multi-vector foreign policy. Long-term effects depend on implementation and whether the US-India thaw holds amid ongoing issues like Russian oil or broader geopolitics.